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New media, like the computer technology on which it relies, races si-
multaneously towards the future and the past, towards what we might call 
the bleeding edge of obsolescence. Indeed, rather than asking, What is new 
media? we might want to ask what seem to be the more important ques-
tions: what was new media? and what will it be? To some extent the phe-
nomenon stems from the modifier new: to call something new is to ensure 
that it will one day be old. The slipperiness of new media—the difficulty of 
engaging it in the present—is also linked to the speed of its dissemination. 
Neither the aging nor the speed of the digital, however, explains how or 
why it has become the new or why the yesterday and tomorrow of new 
media are often the same thing. Consider concepts such as social network-
ing (MUDS to Second Life), or hot YouTube videos that are already old and 
old email messages forever circulated and rediscovered as new. This con-
stant repetition, tied to an inhumanly precise and unrelenting clock, 
points to a factor more important than speed—a nonsimultaneousness of 
the new, which I argue sustains new media as such.
Also key to the newness of the digital is a conflation of memory and 
storage that both underlies and undermines digital media’s archival prom-
ise. Memory, with its constant degeneration, does not equal storage; al-
though artificial memory has historically combined the transitory with the 
permanent, the passing with the stable, digital media complicates this re-
lationship by making the permanent into an enduring ephemeral, creating 
unforeseen degenerative links between humans and machines. As I explain 
in more detail later, this conflation of memory with storage is not due to
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some inherent technological feature, but rather due to how everyday usage
and parlance arrests memory and its degenerative possibilities in order to
support dreams of superhuman digital programmability. Unpacking the
theoretical implications of constantly disseminated and regenerated digi-
tal content, this paper argues these dreams create, rather than solve, archi-
val nightmares. They proliferate nonsimultaneous enduring ephemerals.
The Future, This Time Around
Prophesying the future of digital media is, once more, in fashion. With
the now-embarrassing utopian and dystopian hype around the internet
and Y2K comfortably behind us (or at least archived), there is a growing
impatience with the so-called critical hindsight that flourished after the
dotbombs and 9/11. Rather than the sobering if banal reassessments of
internet communications as a “double-edged sword,” the main strain of
digital media analysis—popular and scholarly—is on future possibilities.1
Howard Rheingold, who helped popularize virtual reality and virtual com-
munities, has written a book on the next social revolution, smart mobs;
everyone is now speculating about the web 3.0, the semantic web in which
1. After 9/11, the discourse of the internet as inherently good came under attack. Steven 
Levy, among other authors, who fought against the Communications Decency Act, suddenly
“discovered” the dark side of the internet, writing, “modern technologies that add efficiency, 
power and wonder to our lives inevitably deliver the same benefits to evildoers. The Internet is 
no exception” (Steven Levy, “Tech’s Double-Edged Sword,” Newsweek [Nexis], 24 Sept. 2001). 
After the dotcom boom, criticality was also the buzz word in more academic circles. For 
instance, the Inter-Society for Electronic Arts 2004 symposium, one of the largest and longest-
running international digital art symposiums, emphasized themes such as critical interactivity 
and had a reflective focus. In contrast, the 2006 symposium emphasized themes such as
“transvergence,” arguing: “new ideas and possibilities never before considered become evident 
when diverse disciplines intersect” (Steve Dietz, “ZeroOne San Jose / ISEA2006 Themes,”
01sj.org/content/view/188/30/). Hyperpolis 3.0, a small annual new-media conference, also 
emphasized “really useful media” for its 2006 conference, arguing that we already know too 
much about “media communications technologies as instruments of social control. . . . about 
media discourses as, on the one hand, ‘popular culture’: alienated and commodified cultural 
forms; and on the other, ‘cultural theory’: paranoid cosmologies of hyper-rhetoric, and the 
ubiquitous inevitability of evil” (idmi.poly.edu/?qdrupal/&qhyper). Importantly, the 
criticality discovered after 9/11 also rewrote history, erasing the critical strains in digital media 
that always existed.
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information andmeaning will finally coincide.2 Even longstanding critical
organizations, such as the Australian organization fibreculture, dedicated
to “critical and speculative interventions in the debate and discussions
concerning information technology,” have joined the bandwagon, enti-
tling the 2007 Digital Arts and Culture (DAC) association’s conference in
Perth “The Future of Digital Media.”3
This future 2.0, like web 2.0 or 3.0, is not as utopian or bold as its
mid-1990s predecessor, which was billed as the future. There are no upbeat
yet paranoid commercials promising an end to racial discrimination and
the beginnings of a happy global village; there are nomust-read cyberpunk
novels or films outlining its gritty, all-encompassing nature, although new
media does now encompass bio- and nanotech.4 This return to the future
as future simple—as what will be, as what you will do, as a programmed
upgrade to your already existing platform—will no doubt recede and then
reappear. Its cycle is partly driven by economics. Silicon Valley has recov-
ered from the demise of the “new economy.” Google is trading well over
four hundred dollars per share. Ipods and BlackBerry devices are every-
where. There is a sense that something is and has changed. NBC an-
nounced layoffs in 2006 not only because its programming is doing poorly
but also because kids just aren’t watching TV on TV anymore.5 Also,
Facebook has moved successfully from college campuses to the English-
speaking public in general, and Michael Zuckerberg is apparently replac-
ing Larry Page and Sergey Brin as the valley’s new IT kid. YouTube is
impacting U.S. presidential elections; CNN now covers blog content as
breaking news; and Skype seems poised to make the videophone, con-
ceived in the 1970s and 1980s, an everyday reality.6
This return to the future or to the “emerging” in new media and its
study is also a reaction to a perceived crisis within net criticism. When, in
2001, Lev Manovich chastised scholars for focusing on future rather than
2. See Howard Rheingold, Smart Mobs: The Next Social Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.,
2003), and John Markoff, “Entrepreneurs See a Web Guided by Common Sense,” New York
Times, 12 Nov. 2006, www.nytimes.com/2006/11/12/business/12web.html?ex1320987600&en
254d697964cedc62&ei5088
3. www.fibreculture.org/, and www.beap.org/dac/
4. For more on the mid- to late-1990s utopian vision of the internet, see Wendy Hui Kyong
Chun, Control and Freedom: Power and Paranoia in the Age of Fiber Optics (Cambridge, Mass.,
2006).
5. See David Lieberman, Peter Johnson, and Gary Levin, “NBC Universal Plans Cost Cuts,
Layoffs,” USA Today, 20 Oct. 2006, www.usatoday.com/money/media/2006-10-19-nbc_x.htm
6. See Michael Arrington, “85% of College Students Use FaceBook,” TechCrunch, 7 Sept.
2005, www.techcrunch.com/2005/09/07/85-of-college-students-use-facebook/, and Ryan Lizza,
“The YouTube Election,”New York Times, 20Aug. 2006, www.nytimes.com/2006/08/20/
weekinreview/20lizza.html?ex1313726400&en a605fabfcb81eebf&ei5088&partnerrssnyt&emcrss
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8. See William Gibson, Pattern Recognition (New York, 2003).
9. Lovink,My First Recession: Critical Internet Culture in Transition (Amsterdam, 2003),
p. 12.
10. See McKenzie Wark, “The Weird Global Media Event and the Tactical Intellectual
[Version 3.0],” in New Media, Old Media: A History and Theory Reader, ed. Chun and Thomas
Keenan (New York, 2006), pp. 265–76.
11. Paul Virilio, “Speed and Information: Cyberspace Alarm!” CTheory, www.ctheory.net/
articles.aspx?id72
12. Virilio, “The Visual Crash,” in Ctrl [Space]: Rhetorics of Surveillance from Bentham to
Big Brother, ed. Thomas Y. Levin, Ursula Frohne, and Peter Weibel (exhibition catalog, Center
for Art and Media, 12 Oct. 2001–24 Feb. 2002), p. 112; see Virilio, “Red Alert in Cyberspace!”
www.watsoninstitute.org/infopeace/vy2k/red-alert.cfm
already existing technologies—for conflating demo with reality, fiction 
with fact—and Peter Lunenfeld and Geert Lovink categorized much the-
oretical work as “vapor theory,” their criticism seemed a much-needed 
admonishment.7 It was a call for theorists to wake up from their virtual 
reality or, to play with William Gibson’s famous description of the matrix, 
their consensually hallucinated cyberspace. Even Gibson has started writ-
ing about actually existing technology.8 Engaging the present, however, 
has not been so easy. Gibson’s more recent books have not been as popular 
as his early ones. It would seem that presently existing media objects are 
rather boring or have a short lifespan. Indeed, in a way to avoid both the 
future and the present, Neal Stephenson now writes about the past, and the 
scholarly trend towards “media archaeology” is similarly retrospective, 
even if it is not traditionally historical or progressivist.
Speed and variability apparently confound critical analysis. According 
to Lovink, “because of the speed of events, there is a real danger that an 
online phenomenon will already have disappeared before a critical dis-
course reflecting on it has had the time to mature and establish itself as 
institutionally recognized knowledge.”9 More broadly, McKenzie Wark 
has argued that traditional scholarship is incompatible with the types of 
images and events, produced and disseminated along lightninglike speed 
media vectors, that interrupt the homogenous and abstract formal time of 
scholarship.10 In making this diagnosis, Wark draws from the work of Paul 
Virilio, who has argued that cyberspace has implemented a real time that is 
eradicating local spaces and times. This global one time threatens “a total 
loss of the bearings of the individual”11 and “a loss of control over reason,” 
as the interval between image and subject disappears.12 More narrowly, 
Manovich has argued that the critical blindness brought about by speed is 
peculiarly American: “the speed with which new technologies are assimi-
7. See Lev Manovich, The Language of New Media (Cambridge, Mass., 2001), and Peter 
Lunenfeld, “Interview with Peter Lunenfeld,” interview by Geert Lovink, 31 July 2000,
www.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-0008/msg00008.html
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lated in the United States makes them ‘invisible’ almost overnight: they
become an assumed part of the everyday existence, something which does
not seem to require much reflection. The slower speed of assimilation and
the higher costs involved give other countries more time to reflect upon
new technologies, as it was the case with newmedia and the Internet in the
1990s.”13 Manovich’s geographic analysis and his linking of speed to cost is
intriguing, but once again speed is labeled as the culprit. In addition to
speed, malleability also makes criticism difficult by troubling a grounding
presumption of humanities research: the reproducibility of sources. The
fact that we cannot all access the same text—because, for example, the
page has simply disappeared—seems an affront to scholarly analysis.14This
lack of verifiability gives a different spin to discourses of trust that domi-
nate technology planning.
In response to these difficulties, Lovink and Wark both argue that the
time of theory itself needs to change; Lovink’s “theory on the run” and
Wark’s theory as “micro-event” take on the same temporality or speed as
digital media, refusing to stand outside their mode of dissemination. Lov-
ink’s theory is a “living entity, a set of proposals, preliminary propositions
and applied knowledge collected in a time of intense social-technological
acceleration.” It is not only on the run because it engages the present but
also because it “expresses itself in a range of ways, as code, interface design,
social networks and hyperlinked aphorisms, hidden in mailing-list mes-
sages, weblogs and chatrooms and sent as SMSmessages.”15Wark similarly
discusses the work of tactical intellectuals as a kind of micro-event in
which “the media tactician presents an image that endangers the conven-
tions of journalistic narrative time, yet which is capable of inserting itself
into it.”16 That is, the micro-event travels along the same media vectors as
the mainstream event itself, displacing the event’s terms in its travels.
Wark’s critical work exemplifies this kind of intervention; it appears first
on the net and then later in print. Although I am sympathetic to these
13. Manovich, “New Media from Borges to HTML,” in The New Media Reader, ed. Noah
Wardrip-Fruin and Nick Monfort (Cambridge, Mass., 2003), p. 13.
14. If the validity of the scientific method rests on (hypothetical) experimental
reproducibility, the validity of a humanities-based critique depends on access to cited
documents. The fact that criticism still happens reveals the extent to which both humanities
and scientific scholarship itself depends on a “virtual witnessing.” For more on the importance
of virtual witnessing to the scientific method, see Steven Shapiro and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan
and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life (Princeton, N.J., 1989), and Peter
Dear, Discipline and Experience: The Mathematical Way in the Scientific Revolution (Chicago,
1995).
15. Lovink,My First Recession, pp. 15, 42.
16. Wark, “Robot Journalists and the Ironies of Tactical Media,” www.nettime.org/Lists-
Archives/nettime-l-0205/msg00093.html
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efforts and agree that digital media criticism needs to be on the net rather
than simply about it, I also believe we need to think beyond speed.
The fact that the present is hard to engage or that scholarly certainty lags
behind its object of analysis or that there is a need for intervention is hardly
profound. Scholars studying global climate change, for instance, have con-
sistently argued that by the time we know whether or not their predictions
are true it will be too late. Thus, one must act as though future predictions
(models or demos) were fact in order to prevent the predicted future from
taking place. Also, the lag between a digital object’s creation and its pop-
ular or scholarly uptake—its nonsimultaneous dissemination— does not
belie new media, but rather, as I explain later, grounds it as new. Further,
ephemerality is not new to new media. Television scholars have been grap-
pling with this very question for years. Focusing on actually existing shows,
rather than future episodes, they have theorized TV content in terms of
flow, segmentation, and liveness.17 So, what is different or new about new
media?
Most obviously, networked new media does not follow the same logic of
seriality as television; flow and segmentation do not quite encompass dig-
ital media’s ephemerality. Programming TV and programming new media
are significantly different enterprises. To program a television show is to
schedule or to broadcast it; to program a computer is to produce a series of
stored instructions that supposedly guarantee—and often stand in for—a
certain action. One is descriptive, the other prescriptive. Second (and not
unrelated), digital media with its memory was supposed to be the opposite
of or the solution to television. That is, new-media scholars’ blindness to
the similarities between new media and TV is ideological; it stems from an
overriding belief in digital media as memory—and thus possibly memo-
rable—and TV as liveness.18 When TV was still TV, memory supposedly
marked the difference between it and digital media; unlike TV, digital
media’s content, like the programs it runs, was to be available 24/7. The
always-thereness of digital media was to make things more stable, more
lasting. Digital media, through the memory at its core, was supposed to
solve, if not dissolve, archival problems such as degrading celluloid or
17. Most influentially, Raymond Williams has theorized television in terms of flow in his 
Television: Technology and Cultural Form (London, 1974), and Jane Feuer analyzed the ideology
of liveness and the relationship between flow and segmentation in “The Concept of Live 
Television: Ontology as Ideology,” in Regarding Television: Critical Approaches—An Anthology, 
ed. E. Ann Kaplan (Frederick, Md., 1983), pp. 12–22.
18. Manovich, in The Language of New Media, for instance, makes parallels between new
media and film, virtually ignoring TV altogether. For TV and the ideology of liveness, see 
Feuer’s “The Concept of Live Television.” For more on the differences and similarities between
TV and the internet, see Chun, “Why Cyberspace,” Control and Freedom, pp. 37–76.
scratched vinyl, not create archival problems of its own. The limited life-
span of CDs will no doubt shock those who disposed of their vinyl in favor
of digitally remastered classics, that is, if they still use CDs or an operating
system that can read them. Old computer files face the same problem.
The major characteristic of digital media is memory. Its ontology is
defined by memory, from content to purpose, from hardware to software,
from CD-ROMs to memory sticks, from RAM to ROM. Memory under-
lies the emergence of the computer as we now know it; the move from
calculator to computer depended on “regenerative memory.”19 John von
Neumann in his mythic and controversial First Draft of a Report on the
EDVAC (1945) deliberately used the termmemory organ rather than store,
also in use at the time, in order to parallel biological and computing com-
ponents and to emphasize the ephemeral nature of vacuum tubes.20 Vac-
uum tubes, unlike mechanical switches, can hold values precisely because
their signals can degenerate—and thus regenerate. The internet’s content,
memorable or not, is similarly based on memory. Many websites and dig-
ital media projects focus on preservation: from online museums to the
YouTube phenomenonGeriatic1927, fromCorbis to theGoogle databanks
that store every search ever entered (and link each to an IP address, argu-
ably making Google the Stasi resource of the twenty-first century). Mem-
ory allegedly makes digital media an ever-increasing archive in which no
piece of data is lost.
This always-thereness of newmedia is also what links it to the future as
future simple, as what will be, as predictable progress. By saving the past, it
was supposed to make knowing the future easier. More damningly, it was
to put into place the future simple through the threat of constant exposure;
as aNew York Times article questioned in response to the posting on You-
Tube of a clip of Senator George Allen making a racist remark: “If . . . any
moment of a candidate’s life can be captured on film and posted on the
Web, will the last shreds of authenticity be stripped from our public offi-
cials?”21 Intriguingly, this formulation assumes that racist slurs are the au-
thentic and the true and that public exposure alwaysmakes behaviormore
banal. However, given the legion of students with compromising Face-
book entries who seem oblivious to the fact that potential employers can
19. The move from calculator to computer is also the move from mere machine to human-
emulator; the term computer was first resisted by IBM because computers were initially
human. To call a machine a computer was to imply job redundancy; see Martin Campbell-Kelly
and William Aspray, Computer: A History of the Information Machine (New York, 1996), p. 115.
20. See John von Neumann, First Draft of a Report on the EDVAC, in The Origins of Digital
Computers, ed. Brian Randell (Berlin, 1973), p. 357.
21. Lizza, “The YouTube Election.”
7
Wendy Hui Kyong Chun / The Digital Ephemeral
Bush, in “AsWeMayThink,”writing at the end ofWorldWar II, argues
22. For more on this ideal and its incapacity to explain public behavior, see Keenan,
“Publicity and Indifference (Sarajevo on Television),” PMLA 117 (Jan. 2002): 104–16.
23. See Vannevar Bush, “As We May Think,” Atlantic Monthly (July 1945): www.theatlantic
.com/doc/194507/bush; hereafter abbreviated “A.”
24. See Douglas Engelbart, “Augmenting Human Intellect: A Conceptual Framework”
(1962), www.bootstrap.org/augdocs/friedewald030402/augmentinghumanintellect/
ahi62index.html, and Ted Nelson, Literary Machines: The Report on, and of, Project Xanadu
Concerning Word Processing, Electronic Publishing, Hypertext, Thinkertoys, Tomorrow’s
Intellectual Revolution, and Certain Other Topics Including Knowledge, Education, and Freedom
(Sausalito, Calif., 1981).
25. See Manovich, “New Media from Borges to HTML.”
26. Indeed, Bush deliberately contrasts the memex to expensive digital computers in his
“Memex Revisited,” in New Media, Old Media, pp. 85–95.
check these entries and given that people increasingly record their own 
“transgressions” (such as the English happy slappers), it is not so clear that 
this assumption will hold, even for politicians. Allen, after all, made his 
comment at a public rally and directly addressed the Indian American man 
holding the video recorder. Regardless, digital media was supposed to—in 
its very functioning— encapsulate the enlightenment ideal that better in-
formation leads to better knowledge, which in turn guarantees better de-
cisions.22 As a product of programming, it was to program the future.
As We May Think
This desire for programmability, sustained by a conflation of descrip-
tion with prescription, is most evident in the canonization of Vannevar 
Bush’s “As We May Think.”23 The significance of this text is not under-
stated; it is on almost all Introduction to Digital Media course syllabi and 
is considered to be as influential as, if not more than, Gibson’s Neuro-
mancer because “pioneers” such as Douglas Engelbart and Ted Nelson 
have consistently listed it as an inspiration to them.24 If Neuromancer has 
disappeared from syllabi as digital media criticism has moved away from 
the now embarrassingly fictional and utopian, the equally fictional and 
utopian “As We May Think” has survived because of this direct line of 
influence, which supposedly grounds it (particularly its validation of a 
massive branching structure) as a precursor to the WWW.25 However, the 
fact that the memex—the machine prophesied by Bush but never built—is 
considered a precursor should make us pause because the memex is linked 
to a mechanical, analog future that has not and arguably may not come to 
pass.26 By conflating the memex and the internet, the ephemerality of dig-
ital media is covered over and, more importantly, questions of forgetting 
and degradation are turned into problems for media to solve, as one me-
dium becomes the “memory” of the next.
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that the crucial problem facing scientists and scientific progress is access.
He writes, “a record if it is to be useful to science, must be continuously
extended, it must be stored, and above all it must be consulted.” However,
“publication has been extended far beyond our present ability tomake real
use of the record. The summation of human experience is being expanded
at a prodigious rate, and the means we use for threading through the
consequent maze to the momentarily important item is the same as was
used in the days of square-rigged ships” (“A”). To adequately access the
scientific record, he proposes amechanical solution, thememex (figs. 1–2).
Thememex is a desklikemachinewith two projectors that would enable its
user to make permanent associative links between documents and to re-
trieve them at will. The documents were to be stored as microfilm and
dropped into the machine as necessary. Documents could also be added;
depressing a lever would cause contents placed at the top of the memex to
be photographed into the next blank space in memex film. Although the
compression offered by microfilm was important, associative indexing
distinguished the memex, for Bush argued that the prime issue was selec-
tion; the human record was not being consulted because of cumbersome
systems of indexing. Unlike these alphabetical systems, the memex was to
create associative trails:
When the user is building a trail, he names it, inserts the name in his
code book, and taps it out on his keyboard. Before him are the two
items to be joined, projected onto adjacent viewing positions. At the
bottom of each there are a number of blank code spaces, and a
pointer is set to indicate one of these on each item. The user taps a
single key, and the items are permanently joined. In each code space
appears the code word. Out of view, but also in the code space, is in-
serted a set of dots for photocell viewing; and on each item these dots
by their positions designate the index number of the other item.
Thereafter, at any time, when one of these items is in view, the other
can be instantly recalled merely by tapping a button below the corre-
sponding code space. Moreover, when numerous items have been thus
joined together to form a trail, they can be reviewed in turn, rapidly or
slowly, by deflecting a lever like that used for turning the pages of a book.
It is exactly as though the physical items had been gathered together from
widely separated sources and bound together to form a new book. It is
more than this, for any item can be joined into numerous trails. [“A”]
The memex was, through unseen connections in code space, to simulate
the creation of new physicalmedia. This code space did not function as the
space of digital programming in which material is generated, but rather as
9
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an invisible space of place markers. This associative linking was to make
the memex closer to the human mind, the inspiration for the memex.
Describing the human mind, Bush wrote, “with one item in its grasp, it
snaps instantly to the next that is suggested by the association of thoughts,
in accordance with some intricate web of trails carried by the cells of the
brain. It has other characteristics, of course; trails that are not frequently
followed are prone to fade, items are not fully permanent, memory is
transitory” (“A”). In contrast, thememex’s traces were not to fade,making
it even better than its predecessor.
Bush did not undersell the importance of the memex. He argued that
man needs
F I GUR E 1 . The memex.
F I GUR E 2 . The memex.
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to mechanize his records more fully if he is to push his experiment
[human civilization] to its logical conclusion and not merely become
bogged down part way there by overtaxing his limited memory. His
excursions may be more enjoyable if he can reacquire the privilege of
forgetting the manifold things he does not need to have immediately
at hand, with some assurance that he can find them again if they
prove important. [“A”]
Not only would we be granted once more the privilege of forgetting (as
though any of us could ever be exempt from such a privation), but we
would be saved from repetition—repetitive thought and repetitions in
thought. According to Bush, man should not be burdened with repetitive
thought processes like arithmetic, forwhich there are powerfulmechanical
aids. The creative aspect of thought, Bush writes, “is concerned only with
the selection of the data and the process to be employed and the manipu-
lation thereafter is repetitive in nature and hence a fit matter to be rele-
gated to the machine” (“A”). The memex could also prevent repetitive
discoveries, for the danger of nonmechanically induced forgetting is rep-
etition. In “Memex Revisited,” which is itself an interesting repetition of
“As We May Think,” he contends:
An Austrian monk, Gregor Mendel, published a paper in 1865 which
stated the essential bases of the modern theory of heredity. Thirty
years later the paper was read by men who could understand and ex-
tend it. But for thirty years Mendel’s work was lost because of the cru-
dity with which information is transmitted between men.
This situation is not improving. The summation of human experi-
ence is being expanded at a prodigious rate, and the means we use for
threading through the consequent maze to the momentarily impor-
tant items are almost the same as in the days of square-rigged ships.
We are being buried in our own product. Tons of printed material are
dumped out every week. In this are thoughts, certainly not often as
great as Mendel’s, but important to our progress. Many of them be-
come lost; many others are repeated over and over and over.27
Thus the scientific archive, rather than pointing us to the future, is trap-
ping us in the past, making us repeat the present over and over again. Our
product is burying us and the dream of linear additive progress is limiting
what wemay think; but the phrase “as we may think” is richly ambiguous.
At one level, it refers to a technologically enhanced future: what we might
27. Bush, “Memex Revisited,” p. 85. See “A,” quoted above on p. 156.
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think if we develop prosthetic machines to supplement and access the 
human record or what we might think without these devices. The word 
may, however, also refers to an authoritarian sanction; one is given the 
right to think X, one may think X, in which case the authority would be the 
machines themselves, our supposedly loyal servants. Most importantly for 
this argument, may is an uncertain link to the future; one may think this, 
but one is not sure. Reading against the grain of Bush’s argument, I con-
tend that this uncertainty stems not from the lack of devices such as the 
memex but from the act of reading itself.
In Bush’s writing, and in prognoses for the information revolution 
more generally, there is no difference between access to and understanding 
the record, between what would be called, perhaps symptomatically, ma-
chine reading and human reading and comprehension, between informa-
tion and argument. The difficulty supposedly lies in selecting the data, not 
in reading it, for it is assumed that reading is a trivial act, a simple com-
prehension of the record’s content. Once the proper record is selected, 
there is no misreading, no misunderstanding, only transparent informa-
tion. If the scientific record has not been advanced, if thought is repeated, 
it is because something has not been adequately disseminated. Bush’s ar-
gument assumes that human records make possible the construction of an 
overarching archive of human knowledge in which there is no gap, no 
absence—a summation of human knowledge. The scientific archive thus 
restores or should restore to man everything that has eluded him.28 So if 
there is discontinuity in history it is due to a historical accident, to our 
inability to adequately consult the human record, to human fallibility. This 
accident, however, can be solved by machines, which are viewed here as 
surprisingly accident-free and permanent.
A machine alone, however, cannot turn “an information explosion into 
a knowledge explosion”;29 it cannot fulfill the promise of what Foucault has 
called traditional history. Even media as stable as microfilm fade and 
break, and this forgetting of the physics of the storage medium—this con-
version of medium into storage— grounds Bush’s progressivist and ideal-
ist ideology. Also, as the case of Mendel reveals, the problem is not access 
but rather larger epistemological frameworks. All three researchers who 
performed similar experiments to Mendel’s thirty-five years after him con-
sulted the scientific record and “found” Mendel, which means that Men-
del’s paper was not lost. The question is not, Why was Mendel forgotten?
28. This is Foucault’s description of traditional history in his The Archaeology of Knowledge, 
trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York, 1982).
29. Wardrip-Fruin and Montfort, introduction to “As We May Think,” in The New Media 
Reader, p. 35.
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but, rather, why, in 1900, was he remembered (and exactly what was re-
membered) three times independently? Andwhy, in the history of science,
is Mendel constantly being rediscovered? As Jann Sapp argues in “The
Nine Lives of Gregor Mendel,” this constant reinvocation is linked to the
desire, on the part of reformers, to pinMendel down as the source of their
genetics.30 Repetition is thus not the evidence of thought wasted but of
thought disseminated. Repetition, as Derrida has argued, bothmakes pos-
sible and impossible the archival process; it is the fever, the destruction, at
the heart of the archive.31The pleasure of forgetfulness is to some extent the
pleasure of death and destruction. It is thus no accident that this supple-
menting of human memory has also been imagined as the death of the
human species in somany fictions and films and de´ja` vu as themark of the
artificial in The Matrix.
The example ofMendel is also revealing because this belief in sources—
Mendel as the source of genetics, memex as the source of the internet, and,
as I have argued elsewhere, code as the source of our computers—is ulti-
mately based on a conflation of storage with access, of memory with stor-
age, of word with action.32 This belief depends on our machines as more
stable and permanent and, thus, better record holders than human mem-
ory; it depends on an analogy between digital and analogmedia. This belief
is remarkably at odds with the material transience of discrete information
and the internet.
Digital media is not always there. We suffer daily frustrations with dig-
ital sources that just disappear. Digital media is degenerative, forgetful,
eraseable. This degenerationmakes it both possible and impossible for it to
imitate analog media. It is perhaps a history-making device, but only
through its ahistorical (or memoryless) functioning, through the ways in
which it constantly transmits and regenerates text and images. If, as Mary
Ann Doane has argued, film as a historical artifact and the filmic moment
as historical event are inextricably intertwined, the two are separated in
digital media, and it is this separation that grounds computer memory as
such.33 The age of a computer memory device rarely corresponds with the
age of thememory it holds; the device and its content do not fade together.
If computer memory is like anything, it is like erasable writing; but, if a
30. See Jann Sapp, “The Nine Lives of Gregor Mendel,” in Experimental Inquiries:
Historical, Philosophical, and Social Studies of Experimentation in Science, ed. H. E. Le Grand
(Dordrecht, 1990), pp. 137–66.
31. See Jacques Derrida, Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression, trans. Eric Prenowitz
(Chicago, 1996).
32. See Chun, “Code as Media” (unpublished paper).
33. See Mary Ann Doane, The Emergence of Cinematic Time: Modernity, Contingency, the
Archive (Cambridge, Mass., 2002), p. 223.
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penciled word can be erased because graphite is soft, a computer’s memory 
can be rewritten because its surface constantly fades.
Moving Memory
Von Neumann’s First Draft of a Report on the EDVAC introduced the 
concept of stored-program computing and memory to the U.S. military 
and the academy. Intriguingly, it also began the freezing of memory and 
execution, key to the emergence of computers as media machines.
A hallmark of this report is its abstractness; rather than describing ac-
tually existing vacuum tubes and mercury delay lines, von Neumann used 
ideal “elements drawn not from telecommunications engineering but 
rather from Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts’s idealized, cyberneti-
cized neurons (which were themselves inspired by the work of Alan Tur-
ing). These idealized neurons, like software after them, were based on a 
conflation of stimulus with action, word with result. McCulloch and Pitts 
sought to create “a logical calculus of the ideas immanent in nervous ac-
tivity” through a conflation of word with result, asserting that “the re-
sponse of any neuron [is] factually equivalent to a proposition which 
proposed its adequate stimulus.”34 That is, an instruction or program is 
functionally equivalent to its result. As I have argued elsewhere, this con-
flation grounds programming, in which process in time is reduced to pro-
cess in space. As Edsger Dijkstra asserts in his famous “Go to Statement 
Considered Harmful,” “the quality of programmers is a decreasing func-
tion of the density of go to statements in the programs they produce” 
because they go against the fundamental tenet of what Dijkstra considered 
to be good programming, namely, the necessity to “shorten the conceptual 
gap between the static program and the dynamic process, to make the 
correspondence between the program (spread out in text space) and the 
process (spread out in time) as trivial as possible.”35 That is, go tos make 
difficult the conflation of instruction with its product—the reduction of 
process to command, execution to legislation—which grounds the emer-
gence of software as a concrete entity and commodity, which grounds 
programs as the source of a computer’s actions. Go tos make it difficult for 
the source program to act as a legible source, painfully revealing the work 
necessary to make the source code a viable source and the fact that source
34. Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts, “A Logical Calculus of the Ideas Immanent in 
Nervous Activity,” in McCulloch, Embodiments of Mind (Cambridge, Mass., 1965), p. 21.
35. Edsger W. Dijkstra, “Go to Statement Considered Harmful,” in Software Pioneers: 
Contributions to Software Engineering, ed. Manfred Broy and Ernst Denert (Berlin, 2002), p. 352.
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code is only source code after the fact.36 This glossing over the vicissitudes
of execution is also evident in von Neumann’s discussion of memory.
Memory, which vonNeumann initially viewed as afferent neurons, was
also not a simple borrowing from biology. By calling certain parts of the
computer a “memory organ,” vonNeumannwas asserting, against biolog-
ical evidence, that such an organ existed. This memory, unlike Bush’s
imaginings, was digital in form. Von Neumann’s analogy between com-
puter and human memory depends on a leap of faith. It is an analogy to
something, which, he admitted over ten years after the draft, is unknown
but logically necessary. In The Computer and the Brain, von Neumann
writes:
It is just as well to admit right at the start that all physical assertions
about the nature, embodiment, and location of [human memory] are
equally hypothetical. We do not know where in the physically viewed
nervous system a memory resides; we do not know whether it is a
separate organ or a collection of specific parts of other already known
organs, etc. It may well be residing in a system of specific nerves,
which would then have to be a rather large system. It may well have
something to do with the genetic mechanism of the body. We are as
ignorant of its nature and position as were the Greeks, who suspected
the location of the mind in the diaphragm. The only thing we know is
that it must be a rather large-capacity memory, and that it is hard to
see how a complicated automaton like the human nervous system
could do without one.37
This statement, which seems so carefully qualified—we basically do not
knowwhat thememory is or where it resides—at the same time asserts the
existence of amemory organ—or set of organs. This assertion assumes the
separation of action from data, of order frommachinic execution that was
36. The argument that source code is only source code after the fact draws from my work
in “Code as Media.” In it, I stress the fact that source code is historically posterior to object
code—source code emerged with the introduction of higher-level programming languages and
early programmers debugged the “object” rather than the source code. Source code is not
executable. For it to become so, it must be compiled or interpreted, and this making-executable
of code is not a trivial action; the compilation of code is not the same as translating a decimal
number into a binary one. Rather, it involves instruction explosion and the translation of
symbolic into real addresses, that is, a breakdown, using numerical methods, of the steps
needed to perform what seems a simple arithmetic calculation. This is most clear in the use of
numerical methods to turn integration—a function performed fluidly in analog computers—
into a series of simpler arithmetical steps. Also, some programs may be executable, but not all
compiled code within that program is executed; rather, lines are read in as necessary. So, source
code thus only becomes source after the fact.
37. Von Neumann, The Computer and the Brain (1958; New Haven, Conn., 2000), p. 61.
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40. Von Neumann, The Computer and the Brain, p. 36.
41. This notion of memory as static files is linked to von Neumann’s suspicion, perhaps
drawn from psychoanalysis, that memories never die. McCulloch’s paper “Why the Mind Is in
the Head” followed von Neumann’s “General and Logical Theory of Automata” at the same
Hixon symposium; in it, McCulloch writes:
I see an argument that one might make against the view that memory in any form actually
resides in the neurons. It is a negative argument, and far from cogent. How reasonable is it?
This is the argument: There is a good deal of evidence that memory is static, unerasable,
resulting from an irreversible change. (This is of course the very opposite of a “reverberat-
ing,” dynamic, erasable memory.) Isn’t there some physical evidence for this? If this is cor-
rect, then no memory, once acquired, can be truly forgotten. Once a memory-storage place
is occupied, it is occupied forever, the memory capacity that it represents is lost; it will
never be possible to store anything else there. What appears as forgetting is then not true
forgetting, but merely the removal of that particular memory-storage region from a condi-
put in place by computers. That is, although stored-program computing 
stores instructions and data within the same memory registers, it also 
strictly separates process and data. This guess as to capacity assumes that 
the brain stores information as bits, which are then processed by it, and not 
as traces of events through the combination of neurons, which is a field-
based or analogy-based system of memory. Von Neumman’s nervous sys-
tem is a digital calculator, not an analog simulator.38
Von Neumann’s concept of memory also blurs the boundary between 
machine and human. The machine memory was to contain values and 
orders that were usually stored in an outside recording medium, such as 
paper cards, but not all values were to be placed inside the machine at all 
times. The machine was to have a hierarchy of memories based on access 
time. The primary memory comprised expensive registers to be accessed 
quickly and, ideally, randomly. The Institute for Advanced Study machine 
used a Williams tube (basically a television tube) as its primary memory. 
This memory was supplemented by a secondary memory or storage me-
dium that could hold in blocks values needed for a calculation. Interest-
ingly, the devices listed as possible secondary memories were also other 
forms of media: teletype tapes, magnetic wire or tapes, or movie film.39 A 
third form of memory was “dead storage”: the input or the output or, as 
von Neumann later put it in The Computer and the Brain, “the outside 
world.”40 This reference to the world outside of the computer as memory 
conflates storage with medium, the dead with the live, the dead with the 
de/regenerative. It makes computer memory a form of filing, where the 
paper file—the natural automata’s alleged secondary memory—is “un-
generative” and therefore deadly permanent.41 Again, before the use of
38. For more on the brain as an analog simulator, see Alain Berthoz, The Brain’s Sense of 
Movement, trans. Giselle Weiss (Cambridge, Mass., 2000).
39. See Arthur W. Burks, Herman H. Goldstine, and von Neumann, Preliminary Discussion 
of the Logical Design of an Electronic Computing Instrument (Princeton, N.J., 1947), p. 6.
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regeneration, the term in usewas store (Charles Babbage’s term), notmem-
ory. The predecessor to the EDVAC, the ENIAC, stored values in its func-
tion table, and, although these were later used to store instructions, these
function tables were not called memory. The term memory or, initially,
regenerativememory enters withmercury delay lines andWilliams tubes—
nonstatic devices that can hold values because their signals degenerate.
Quickly, however—indeed in the same document—the difference be-
tween dynamic and static devices is erased; as the modifier regenerative is
dropped, all storage becomes memory.
Storage cum memory also links computers to genetics. Von Neumann
included genes within his category of memory, erasing the difference be-
tween memory accessible to the human mind and memory accessible to
the human body. Given the etymology of mind as the state of being re-
membered, this is an intriguing erasure. By making genes a form of mem-
ory, von Neumann also erases the difference between individual and
transgenerational memory, making plausible Lamarckian transmission; if
chromosomes are a form of secondary memory, they can presumably be
written by the primary. This genetic linkage to memory makes clear the
stakes of conflating memory with storage—a link from the past to the
future. Indeed, stored instructions as genes (or an approximation of them)
was key to von Neumann’s theory of self-reproducing automata.42
Crucially, memory is an active process, not static. A memory must be
held in order to keep it from moving or fading. Memory does not equal
storage. While memory looks backward, according to theOED, to store is
to furnish, to build stock. Storage or stocks always look towards the future.
In computerspeak, one reverses common language because one stores
something in memory. This odd reversal and the conflation of memory
and storage glosses over the impermanence and volatility of computer
memory. Without this volatility, however, there would be no memory.
Memory stems from the same Sanskrit root formartyr, perhaps compara-
tion of rapid and easy availability to one of lower availability. It is not like the destruction of
a system of files, but rather like the removal of a filing cabinet into the cellar. Indeed, this
process in many cases seems to be reversible. Various situations may bring the “filing cabi-
net” up from the “cellar” and make it rapidly and easily available again. [McCulloch, Em-
bodiments of Mind, pp. 92–93]
Von Neumann’s move to files is intriguing, especially given the importance of files—and of
disposing files—tomodern bureaucracy and state power. Formore on this, seeCorneliaVismann,
Files: Law and Media Technology, trans. Geoffrey Winthrop-Young (Stanford, Calif., 2008).
42. See von Neumann, “The General and Logical Theory of Automata,” Papers of John von
Neumann on Computing and Computer Theory, ed. William Aspray and Arthur Burks
(Cambridge, Mass., 1987), p. 421.
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The artificial memory is established from places and images, . . .
the stock definition to be forever repeated down the ages. A locus
is a place easily grasped by the memory, such as a house, an inter-
columnar space, a corner, an arch, or the like. Images are forms,
marks or simulacra . . . of what we wish to remember. For instance
if we wish to recall the genus of a horse, of a lion, of an eagle, we
must place their images on definite loci.
The art of memory is like an inner writing. Those who know the
letters of the alphabet can write down what is dictated to them and
read out what they have written. Likewise those who have learned
mnemonics can set in places what they have heard and deliver it from
memory. “For the places are very much like wax tablets or papyrus,
the images like the letters, the arrangement and disposition of the
images like the script, and the delivery is like the reading.”43
Visiting these memorized places, one revives the fact to be recalled. This
discussion of memory offers a different interpretation of the parallels be-
tween human and computermemory. The rhetoricianwas to recall a phys-
ical space within his mind; the image is not simply what is projected upon
a physical space but also the space for projection. Similarly, computer
memory (which too is organized spatially) is a storage medium like paper,
but not quite. Both degenerate, revealing the limitations of the simile.
Memory as active process is seen quite concretely in early forms of
regenerative memory, from the mercury delay line to the Williams tube.
The serial mercury delay line took a series of electrical pulses and used a
crystal to transform them into sound waves, which would make their way
relatively slowly down the mercury tube (fig. 3). At the far end, the sound
waves would be amplified and reshaped.44 One tube could usually store
43. Frances Yates, The Art of Memory (Chicago, 1966), pp. 6–7.
44. See Michael R. Williams, A History of Computing Technology (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,
1977), pp. 306–16.
ble to the ancient Greek term for “baneful,” “fastidious.” Memory is an act 
of commemoration—a process of recollecting or remembering.
The commemoration, of course, entails both the permanent and the 
ephemeral. Memory, especially artificial memory, has traditionally 
brought together the permanent with the ephemeral, for instance, the wax 
tablet with eraseable letters—the inspiration for classical mnemotechnics. 
As Frances A. Yates explains, the rhetorician treated architecture as a writ-
ing substrate, on which images, correlating to objects to be remembered, 
were inscribed. Summarizing the Ad herennium, she states:
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about one thousand binary bits at any givenmoment. Another earlymem-
ory device, the Williams tube (fig. 4), derived from developments in cath-
ode ray tubes (CRTs); the television set is not just a computer screen, but
was also once its memory. The Williams tube, when a beam of electrons
hits its phosphor surface, not only produces a spot of light but also a
charge. This charge will persist for about .2 seconds before it leaks away
and can be detected by a parallel collector plate. Thus, if this charged spot
can be regenerated at least five times per second,memory can be produced
in the same manner as the mercury delay tube. Current forms of memory
also require regeneration. Today’s RAM is mostly volatile and based on
flip-flops, transistors, and capacitors, which require a steady electrical cur-
rent. Although we do have forms of nonvolatile memory, such as flash
memory, made possible by better insulated capacitors, they do have a
limited read-write cycle.
Thus, as Wolfgang Ernst has argued, digital media is truly a time-based
medium, which, given a screen’s refresh cycle and the dynamic flow of
information in cyberspace, turns images, sounds, and text into discrete
F I GUR E 3 . The mercury delay tube.
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moments in time. These images are frozen for human eyes only.45 Infor-
mation is dynamic, however, not only because it must move in space but
also, and more importantly, because degeneration—not regeneration—
makes memory possible, while simultaneously threatening it. Digital me-
dia, which is allegedly more permanent and durable than other media
(film stock, paper, and so on), depends on a degeneration actively denied
and repressed. This degeneration, which engineers would like to divide
into useful and harmful (eraseability versus signal decomposition, infor-
mation versus noise) belies the promise of digital computers as permanent
memory machines. If our machines’ memories are more permanent, if
they enable a permanence that we seem to lack, it is because they are
constantly refreshed so that their ephemerality endures, so that they may
store the programs that seem to drive our machines.
This enduring ephemeral—a battle of diligence between the passing
and the repetitive—also characterizes content. The internet may be avail-
able 24/7, but specific content may not. Further, if things constantly dis-
appear, they also reappear, often to the chagrin of those trying to erase
data. When Article III Groupie (A3G), the gossipy conservative and sup-
posedly female author of underneaththeirrobes.blogs.com, came out as a
thirty-year-old Newark-based U.S. Attorney named David Lat in an inter-
45. See Wolfgang Ernst, “Dis/continuities: Does the Archive Become Metaphorical in
Multi-Media Space?” in New Media, Old Media, p. 118. Although this is certainly true for CRT
screens, it is not necessarily true for LCD screens, which operate more like blinds that allow
certain portions of light through or not.
F I GUR E 4 . Williams tube.
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view with The New Yorker, his site was temporarily taken down by the U.S.
government.46 Archives of his site—and every other site that does not
reject robots—however, are available at the Internet Wayback Machine
(web.archive.org) with a six-month delay.
Like search engines, the InternetWaybackMachine (IWM) comprises a
slew of robots and servers that automatically and diligently, and in human
terms obsessively, back up most webpages. Also like search engines, they
collapse the difference between the internet, whose breadth is unknow-
able, with its backups; however, unlike search engines, the IWM does not
use this data to render the internet into a library but rather uses these
backups to create what it calls a “library of the Internet.” The library the
IWM creates, though, is certainly odd, for it has no coherent shelving
system; the IWM librarians do not offer a card catalog or a comprehensive
content-based index.47 This is because the IWM’s head librarian is a ma-
chine, only capable of accumulating differing texts. That is, its automatic
power of discrimination only detects updates within a text. The IWM’s
greatest oddity, however, stems from its recursive nature; it and its archives
(the IWM diligently archives itself) are themselves included among the
objects of its archive.
Logically, IWM is also recursive; the imperfect archives of the IWM are
supposedly crucial to the ongoing relevance of libraries. The creators be-
hind IWM state, “libraries exist to preserve society’s cultural artifacts and
to provide access to them. If libraries are to continue to foster education
and scholarship in this era of digital technology, it’s essential for them to
extend those functions into the digital world.”48 The need for cultural
memory drives the IWM and libraries more generally. Noting the loss of
early film archives due to the recycling of early film stock, the archivists
state that they are building an “internet library” because
without cultural artifacts, civilization has no memory and no mecha-
nism to learn from its successes and failures. And paradoxically, with
the explosion of the Internet, we live in what Danny Hillis has re-
ferred to as our “digital dark age.”
The Internet Archive is working to prevent the Internet—a new
46. See Jeffrey Toobin, “SCOTUS Watch,” in “The Talk of the Town,” The New Yorker, 21
Nov. 2005, www.newyorker.com/talk/content/articles/051121ta_talk_toobin
47. This is because there are no shelves, no fixed relation between what is storable and the
place they are stored. As Harriet Bradley has argued, the internet breaks the bond between
location and storage; if before “only what has been stored can be located,” now “memory is no
longer located in specific sites” (Harriet Bradley, “The Seductions of the Archive: Voices Lost
and Found,” History of the Human Sciences 12, no. 2 [1999]: 113).
48. www.archive.org/about/about.php
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The IWM is necessary because the internet, which is in so many ways about
memory, has, as Ernst argues, nomemory—at least notwithout the interven-
tion of something like the IWM.50 Other media do not have a memory, but
they do age, and their degeneration is not linked to their regeneration. This
crisis is brought about alsobecauseof theblindbelief indigitalmedia asmem-
ory. This belief in the internet as culturalmemory, paradoxically, threatens to
spread this lack of memory everywhere and plunge us negatively into a way
way back machine: the so-called digital dark age. The IWM thus fixes the
internetbyofferingusa“machine” that letsuscontrolourmovementbetween
past and future by regenerating the internet on a grand scale. The IWM is
appropriate in more ways than one; because webpages link to, rather than
embed, images, which can be located anywhere, and because link locations
always change, the IWM preserves only a skeleton of a page, filled with bro-
ken—rendered—links and images (fig. 5). These pages are not quite dead, but
not quite alive either; the proper commemoration requires greater effort.
These gapsor this skeletonvisualizes not only the fact that our constant regen-
erations affect what is regenerated but also how these gaps—the irreversibility
of this causal programmable logic—open the web as archive to a future that
would not be a simple memory upgrade of the past.
Repetition and regeneration open the future by creating a nonsimulta-
neous new that confounds the chronological time they also enable. Con-
sider, for instance, the temporality of weblogs. Blogs seem to follow the
timing of newspapers in their plodding chronology, but blogs contain
within themselves archives of their posts, making the blog, if anything, like
the epistolary novel. Unlike the epistolary novel, which, however banal,
was focused around a plot or a moral, the blog entries are tied together
solely by the presence of the so-called author. What makes a blog uninter-
esting is not necessarily its content, which often reads like a laundry list of
things done or to do, but rather its immobility. The ever-updating, inhu-
manly clocked time in which our machines and memories are embedded
and constantly refreshed makes its material stale. The chronology, seem-
ingly enabled by this time, is also compromised by these archives and the
uncertainty of their regular reception. An older post can always be “dis-
covered” as new; a new post is already old. This nonsimultaneousness of
49. Ibid.
50. See Ernst, “Dis/continuities,” p. 119.
medium with major historical significance—and other “born-
digital” materials from disappearing into the past. Collaborating with 
institutions including the Library of Congress and the Smithsonian, 
we are working to preserve a record for generations to come.49
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the new, this layering of chronologies, means that the gap between illocu-
tionary and perlocutionary in high-speed telecommunications may be
dwindling, but—because everything is endlessly repeated—response is
demanded over and over again. The new is sustained by this constant
demand to respond to what we do not yet know; the goal of new media
czars is to constantly create desire for what one has not yet experienced.
To put it most bluntly, this nonsimultaneity of the new—this enduring
ephemeral—means we need to get beyond speed as the defining feature of
digital media or global networked communications. Virilio’s constant in-
sistence on speed as distorting space-time and on real time as rendering us
susceptible to the dictatorship of speed has generated much good work in
F I GUR E 5 . Internet Wayback Machine backup of http://www.princeton.edu/whkchun.
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51. See Virilio, “The Visual Crash” and “Speed and Information: Cyberspace Alarm!”
the field, but it can blind us to the ways in which images do not simply 
assault us at the speed of light.51 Just because images flash up all of a sudden 
does not mean that response or responsibility is impossible or that schol-
arly analysis is no longer relevant. As the new obsession with repetition 
reveals, an image does not flash up only once. The pressing questions are, 
Why and how is it that the ephemeral endures? And what does the constant 
repetition and regeneration of information effect? What loops and what 
instabilities does it introduce into the logic of programmability?
Digital media networks are not based on the regular obsoleteness or 
disposability of information but rather on the resuscitability or the undead 
of information. Even text messaging, which seems to be about the synchro-
nous or the now, enables the endless circulation of forwarded messages, 
which are both new and old. Reliability is linked to deletion; a database is 
considered to be unreliable (to contain “dirty data”) if it does not ade-
quately get rid of older inaccurate information. Also, this repetition, rather 
than detracting from the message, often attests to its importance. Repeti-
tion becomes a way to measure scale in an almost inconceivably vast com-
munications network.
Rather than getting caught up in speed, then, we must analyze, as we try 
to grasp a present that is always degenerating, the ways in which ephem-
erality is made to endure. What is surprising is not that digital media fades 
but rather that it stays at all and that we stay transfixed by our screens as its 
ephemerality endures.
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